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HOSPITAL TRANSFERS INTO NURSING HOMES:
A POTENTIAL CHARTER REMEDY FOR UNWILLING TRANSFEREES
Jack Fleming *
Introduction
This paper will examine the possibility of a Charterl remedy for
persons unwillingly transferred from hospitals into nursing homes.
This happens when doctors decide that patients (often elderly) in
hospitals no longer require a hospital level of care and instead
should receive long term care in a nursing home. Sometimes the
patients involved have resided in the hospital for a long time. The
notice which they are given varies. It is not uncommon for an
elderly patient to simply be told that she or he will be transferred
to the first nursing home bed which comes available.
The concerns of the patients (and their families) are many.
Sometimes they are simply opposed to going to any nursing home,
as they feel that the level of care is better in a hospital. Other
times they object to a particular nursing home because of the
quality of its care or its location. 2  Another concern is the
potential effects of transfer trauma in a relocation without proper
preparation. There is evidence to indicate that involuntary
transfers can lead to significant health problems or death.
As the very basics of interpretation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, let alone their application to a specific case,
have yet to be established, this paper will consider the likely
principles of interpretation to be developed as well as their
application to the instant case.
Jack Fleming is a lawyer at the Halton Hills Community
Legal Clinic and was previously a lawyer at the Advocacy
Centre for the Elderly (where the issue of hospital transfers
into nursing homes arose). c 1985 Copyright in this article
remains with the author.
1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, part I of
Constitution Act 1982.
2. In one case a man, whose wife (herself not in the best of
health) visited him daily at a hospital in Toronto, was
transferred to a nursing home in King City, where his wife
was unable to visit him. c 1985 Copyright in this article
remains with the author.
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There is also little guidance in the caselaw, both Canadian and
American, on the particular issue of involuntary transfers. Cases
depling with similar facts are almost non-existent and it is
necessary to proceed by analogy (just as one must proceed by
analogy in developing interpretation for the Charter due to the
paucity of caselaw). This problem was pointed out by the Florida
District Court of Appeal in La Jeune Road Hospital Inc. v. Watson:
"1... this case must resolve itself upon a determination
of when and under what circumstances may a hospital
discharge a patient against that patient's will. Our




Transfer trauma is the medical term for the effects of involuntary
relocation on the elderly. The medical evidence on transfer
trauma is somewhat contradictory. Some studies have found
negative consequences from relocation, others have not.
Dr. L. Pastalan reviewed the literature on relocation, in a fairly
recent paper, in an attempt to resolve the contradictions. 4 He
found that the apparent contraditions arose largely due to qualify-
ing factors underlying the conclusions 5. He listed five major
factors:
1. The degree of choice in making the move.
2. The degree of environmental change.
3. The degree of health.
4. The degree of preparation.
5. The methodology used in the study.
Analysing the studies in this light, Dr. Pastalan found that in home
to institution moves (which is essentially the situation where
someone is only briefly resident in a hospital prior to transfer to a
nursing home) which are voluntary, the vast majority are
successful, with no decline in health or attitude. He also found
that choice plays an important role in determining post-relocation
3. La Jeune Road Hospital Inc. v. Watson 171 So. 2d 202 (1965),
at 220.
4. Dr. L. Pastalan, Relocation: A State of the Art (unpublished,
Institute of Gerontology, University of Michigan, 1980).
5. Id., at 2.
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mortality. 6  There are few studies on involuntary home to insti-
tution relocation, but those which do exist show an increased
mortality rate over voluntary moves, and indicate that the
similarity of the new environment to the old is also an important
factor.
Studies on moves from one institution to another show a lower
mortality rate where the move is accompanied by extensive
preparation. 7 There are conflicting results in studies on invol-
untary institution to institution transfers, but the majority show an
increasing mortality rate and also indicate that persons in ill health
(as in transfers to nursing homes) have more trouble adapting than
do healthy individuals. 8
Dr. Pastalan also pointed out that the elderly are particularly
susceptible to transfer trauma, 9 and that a carefully designed
relocation preparation program can reduce the danger. He lists
many important considerations in designing such a program,
including personal counselling, involving the relocatee and family
in the decision making as much as possible and visiting the new
location as much as possible before moving.lb
It can be seen from Dr. Pastalan's review of the studies done that
transfer trauma is seen by many researchers to be an important
cause of death among the elderly. It also appears that a relocation
preparation program can have a significant effect on the likelihood
of death from transfer trauma. Dr. Pastalan also notes that the
first three months immediately following the move are the most
dangerous 11 (an important consideration in requesting an in-
junction).
In taking a case to court on the basis of the dangers of transfer
trauma, extensive evidence regarding transfer trauma generally
and as it applied to the individual involved would be necessary. For
the purposes of this paper, it will be asssumed that such evidence
could be produced and it will be assumed that the purpose of
litigation is not to block the transfer entirely, but rather to ensure
that a relocation preparation program is implemented.
6. Id., at 17.
7. Id., at 10.
8. Id., at 17.
9. Id., at 18.
10. Id., at 20.
11. Id., at 22.
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Application of the Charter
In examining the possibility of remedies for unwilling transferees
through the use of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
an initial issue to consider is whether the Charter applies to the
actions of a public hospital. Section 32 of the Charter deals with
its application as follows:
"This Charter applies
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in
respect of all matters within the authority of
Parliament including all matters relating to the Yukon
Territory and Northwest Territories; and
(b) to the legislature and government of each province
in respect of all matters within the authority of the
legislature of each province."
1 2
In the United States, the Bill of Rights applies only to government
action, but government action has been held to include what might
normally be considered private activities if there is sufficient
governmental nexus, e.g. the actions of an institution acting
pursuant to statute, or publicly funded or whose actions affect
entitlement to state provided privileges.
1 3
It is worth noting that s. 32(l) states that the Charter covers the
actions of the federal and provincial governments; it does not say
that it only covers these actions. It is possible for the courts to
say that the Canadian Charter also applies to private individuals
and institutions. 1 4 .
It seems likely that Canadian courts will follow the U. S. sufficient
nexus test and there are already a number of Canadian cases
recognizing that bodies established by statute are reviewable under
the Charter. 1 5 Given that public hospitals are closely regulated by
12. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 32(1).
13. Bender, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
the United States Bill of Rights: A Comparison" (1983), 28
McGill L.J. 811.
14. See R. v. Lerke (June 21, 1984), 12 W.C.B. 325, (Alta Q.B.).
15. Malartie Hygrade Gold Mines Ltd. v. The Queen in Right of
Quebec (1982), 142 D.L.R. (3d) 512, (Que. Sup. Ct.); Black v.
Law Society of Alberta (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 439 (Ata.
Q.B.); Re McCutcheon and City of Toronto (1983), 147 D.L.R.
(3d) 193 (Ont. H.C.J.).
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provincial legislation and receive substantial public funding it is
likely that a court would hold that the Charter applies to their
actions.
Section 7 Analysis
It is s. 7 of the Charter which is most likely to provide a solution to
the problem faced by unwilling transferees. other sections may
also be applicable (e.g. s. 2 and s. 5), but only s. 7 will be
considered in this paper. Section 7 reads as follows:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice." 16
It is submitted that a s.7 analysis should proceed as follows:
1. Does a constitutionally protected interest exist?
2. Has that interest been infringed?
3. Was the infringement made in accordance with the
precepts of fundamental justice?
4. Is the infringement allowable pursuant to s.1 of the
Charter?
5. What is the appropriate remedy?
Establishing a Constitutionally Protected Interest
Is there a constitutionally protected interest here? In deciding
whether constitutional rights exist, courts look at history, custom,
common law and statute law in the jurisdiction and in other "free
and democratic" jurisdictions. 1 7 The thesis in the instant case is
that the "right to life, liberty and the security of the person" is
threatened by a forced transfer from a hospital to a nursing home
without an adequate relocation preparation program. Or, put
16. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s.7.
17. For a good example of this type of analysis see R. L. Crain
Inc. v. Couture and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission
(1984), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 478 (Sask. Q. B.). A superficial
example is found in R. v. Morgentaler (July 20, 1984), 12
W.C.B. 353 (Ont. H.J.C., Parker A.C.J.H.C.), which can be
contrasted to the detailed examination in Roe v. Wade 410
U.S. 113 (1973). See also Ingraham v. Wright 430 U.S. 651
(U.S.C.A. 1976). The validity of reference to American cases
has been noted by the Supreme Court of Canada: Law Society
of Upper Canada v. Skapinker (May 3, 1984), 12 W.C.B. 118.
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another way, that everyone has a right to freedom from transfer
trauma. Existence of this right can be inferred from a number of
sources.
The legislation governing transfers offers little comfort.
Regulation 865 provides as follows:
s.31 11(2) when a patient is no longer in need of
treatment in a hospital, the attending physician shall
write and sign an order that the patient be discharged.
(3) a patient shall be deemed to be discharged when the
attending physician or another member of the medical
staff to whom the attending physician has delegated the
duty, writes and signs the discharge order under
subsection (2) and communicates it to the patient.
(4) when the patient is discharged he shall leave the
hospital the same day but, with the approval of the
administrator, the patient may, at his option, remain in
the hospital for a further period not exceeding 24
hours .... 1118
Thus, there is no right to due process before transfer contained in
the legislation. On the face of the legislation, the hospital can act
quite arbitrarily. Therefore the search for evidence of recognition
in our society of a "life, liberty or security of the person" interest
in arbitrary transfers must be widened to analogous situations.
One source is tort law. There are no malpractice cases directly on
point, but there are American cases stating that a doctor cannot
abandon a client without giving reasonable notice.1 9 It can be
argued that the principle involved is present in the instant case.
There are w Canadian cases on the precise issue of
abandonment.
18. Regulation 865, R.R.O. 1980, s.31(2)(3) and (4).
19. "Annotation: Physician - Abandonment of Case" 57 A.L.R. 2d
432; Pazgar, Legal Aspects of Health Care Administration
(2d ed., Aspen Publications, 1983):
20. Except perhaps Wilson v. Stark (1967), 61 W.W.R. 705, which
did not cite the theory of abandonment developed in the
American cases but did hold that a doctor who abandons his
patients by making inadequate preparations for replacement
when going on vacation is guilty of malpractice.
(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.
There are a few American cases directly on the issue of discharge.
In La Jeune Road Hospital Inc. v. Watson 2 ' and Meiselman v.
Crown Heights Hospitalz abandonment due to premature dis-
charge from hospital was found. In both cases the patient was
seriously ill and was not sent to any other institution. In
Meiselman the plaintiff was discharged into the care of his family
doctor, but he did not have the necessary expertise to deal with the
case.
The clear cut seriousness of the illnesses, and the fact that the
patients clearly required a hospital level of care in both cases,
made those cases easier to litigate than one based on transfer
trauma. However, they do indicate the obligation which is on the
medical profession to ensure the continued adequate treatment of
a patient once treatment has been commenced.
While there are no Canadian cases directly on the issue of
abandonment, Regulation 448 under the Health Disciplines Act
does make it professional misconduct to fail:
1,.. to continue to provide professional services to a
patient until the services are no longer required or until
the patient has had a reasonable opportunity to arrange
for the services of another member."
2 3
As well, the Code of Ethics of the Canadian Medical Asssociation
states that an ethical physician:
Par.15.... will, when he has accepted professional
responsibility for an acutely-ill patient, continue to
provide his services until they are no longer required, or
until he has arranged for the services of another
suitable physician. In any other situation, he may
withdraw from his responsibility for the care of any
patient provided that he gives the patient adequate
notice of his intention;" 2 4
Applied to the instant case, the principle of abandonment (which
itself is merely a subset of the general principles of malpractice
law), together with the requirements of the Health Disciplines Act
and of the C.M.A. Code of Ethics, could be said to encompass
21. 171 So. 2d 202 (1965).
22. 34 N.E. 2d 367 (N.Y.C.A. 1941).
23. Regulation 448, R. R. 0. 1980, s.27.23
24. Code of Ethics, Canadian Medical Association, par.15.
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consideration of the effects of transfer trauma in deciding what
constitutes "adequate notice" and "a reasonable opportunity to
arrange for the services of another [physician]". It can be argued
that to transfer without adequate preparation is akin to terminat-
ing treatment without arranging for adequate replacement servi-
ces.
The tradition that a physician not discontinue treatment of a
patient without ensuring continuing adequate care should be
equally applicable to a hospital as an entity.
2 5
Whether a tort action on these facts would succeed is not the issue:
the concerns expressed in the caselaw provide a building block in
establishing the existence of a constitutional interest.
Some American cases have considered the issue of transfer trauma
directly. In O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Centre 2 6 the United
States Supreme Court rejected the existence of a constitutionally
protected property interest in continued occupancy in a nursing
home which was threatened with closure. This was a case of an
important issue being brought forward on "bad facts": the medicaid
regulations which led to the decision to close the facility were
based on quality of care and were intended to protect seniors as a
class. The case did not really deal with transfer trauma, except in
a very peripheral fashion.
Freedom from transfer trauma has been recognized as a constitu-
tionally protected life and liberty interest in other cases, two of
them being post-O'Bannon although none at the Supreme Court
level.2
7
Moving beyond the specific facts involved in the instant case, a
more general examination of the rights and traditions of our
society, as developed through the doctrine of natural justice, can
be helpful. The caselaw in that area gives an indication of what
25. Hospitals, as well as individual physicians, can be liable for
malpractice: Yepremian v. Scarborough General Hospital
(1978), 20 O.R. (2d) 510, 530 to 531.
26. 447 U. S. 773 (1980)
27. Bracco v. Lackner 462 F. Supp. 436, at 444-45 (Dist. Ct.
Calif. 1978); Yaretsky v. Blum 629 F. 2d 817 (U.S.C.A.
1980), at 821; Klein v. Mathews 430 F. Supp. 1005 (Dist. Ct.
N.J., 1977) at 1009-10; Burchette v. Dumpson 387 F. Supp.
812 (1974), at 819; Brede v. Director for Department of
Health 616 F. 2d 407 (1980), at 412.
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sort of rights are sufficiently important to warrant any sort of
fairness (the current "threshold issue" in administrative law).
Under s. 7, it can be argued that rights comparable in importance
to those which have been held to necessitate procedural safeguards
under the natural justice doctrine are now constitutionally pro-
tected rights under s. 7.
In a hospital transfer case the rights involved concern health (and
potential deterioration of it), life (and potential loss of it),
accommodation, food, medical care and quality of life for a person,
probably for the rest of his or her life. One can look at "natural
justice" cases to see how these sorts of concerns have fared in
seeking protection, in order to build an argument for protection of
analogous rights in the case at hand.
In Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation2 8 the court found that
where someone was being deprived of the benefit of living in
subsidized housing she had a right to be told of the case against her
and to make answer to it. McKinnon, A.C.J.O. stated:
'!If no notice is given to a person who, as a result of
investigation by a public corporation and carrying out a
public obligation, is in danger of losing an important
benefit, and no opportunity is afforded to answer the
"case" against him, such a procedure, in my view, would
be unfair."
2 9
In the Knapman 3 0 case, twenty-nine years ago, the Supreme Court
of Canada decided that there was a requirement to act judicially
(that was the threshold necessity at the time)3 1 in deciding to
28. Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation (1978), 23 D.L.R.
(3d) 187, (Ont. C.A.).
29. Id., at 196.
30. Board of Health for Saltfleet Township v. Knapman (1956), 6
D.L.R. (2d) 81.
31. Since then, of course, the distinction between judicial, or
quasi-judicial, and administrative acts has largely
disappeared and a range of rights are available through the
doctrine of "natural justice", depending on the extent of the
duty to act fairly: Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Regional
Board of Commissioners of Police [19791 S.C.R. 111;
Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board (No. 2)
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 602; Arnett, Rueter and Mendes, "FIRA and
the Rule of Law" (1984), 62 Can. B. Rev. 121, at 129; Evans,
Janisch, Mullan and Risk, Administrative Law, (Emond-
Montgomery Ltd., Toronto, 1980), at 34.
Hospital Transfers Into Nursing Homes
evict occupants from their homes for health reasons. In
Lazarov,3 2 the court felt that denial of an application for
citizenship was sufficiently important to require an opportunity to
dispute the grounds of refusal, despite the fact that the applicant
could apply again in two years time and would continue to live in
Canada regardless.
Surely the harm to unwilling transferees in the instant case is at
least comparable to the potential harm to the individuals in these
cases. In fact, the potential harm in each of these cases, where
procedural fairness was required, was less than the potential harm
to unwilling transferees. Remember that at this stage of the
analysis the court would be considering whether there is a constitu-
tionally protected right to freedom from transfer trauma; the
likely effects on the particular individual involved are not of
concern at this point.
3 3
An analogy can also be made to the American cases on the right to
refuse treatment (usually in the context of psychotropic drugs).
3 4
There are also American cases establishing that state statutes can
create life and liberty interests which are then entitled to due
process.3 5 For example, there may be no constitutionally inherent
right to parole, but once a right to parole is created by statute, due
process applies to its revocation. On this reasoning, it could be
argued that a right to care is established by statute 3ff and can only
32. Lazarov v. Secretary of State of Canada (1973), 38 D.L. R.
(3d) 738.
33. This seems also to have been the analysis of Madam Justice
Wilson in Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration,
as reported in Ontario Lawyers Weekly, Aug. 26, 1985 (the
actual case transcript was unavailable at the time of
writing).
34. Hughes "Liberty From Transfer Trauma: A Fundamental Life
and Liberty Interest" (1982), 94 Hastings Constitutional L.Q.
429, at 443.
35. Vitek v. Jones 445 U.S. 480 (1980), at 488. This is similar to
the reasoning in Re Webb, supr, note 28. See also Goldberg
v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
36. Public Hospitals Act R.S.O. 1980 c. 410, s.17: "Where a
person has been admitted to a hospital by a physician
pursuant to the regulations; and such person requires the
level or type of hospital care for which the hospital is
approved by the regulations, the hospital shall accept such
person as a patient" (emphasis added). Note the mandatory
language.
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be withdrawn with due process.
In the U.S. case of Vitek v. Jones, 3 7 a statute provided that where
a physician designated by the Director of Correctional Services
found that a prisoner was suffering from a mental disease which
could not be given proper treatment in the jail, the Director could
arrange for a transfer to a mental health institution for examin-
ation and treatment. In that case the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the transfer to a mental health institution constituted a major
change in the conditions of confinement amounting to a "grievous
loss" that should not be imposed without the opportunity for notice
and adequate hearing. 3 8 The court held that once the state grants
a right or expectation that an adverse action will not take place
except upon the occurrence of a specified situation then the
determination of that occurrence becomes crucial and requires due
process.
3 9
That reasoning could easily be applied to the instant case, where
the occurence of a specified situation is the determination that "a
patient is no longer in need of treatment in a hospital"4 0 and the
major change in the conditions of life amounting to a "grievous
loss" is the transfer to the nursing home environment.
Some U.S. cases have been interpreted as developing a constitu-
tional right to treatment, although this has largely been implicit
rather than explicit in the cases and certainly has not been
acknowledged at the Supreme Court level. 4 1 This line of reasoning
(thus far largely in the context of involuntary confinement) could
also be used. The reasoning in the famous U. S. Supreme Court
decision of Roe v. Wade 4 2 can also be applied. In that case, the
court found a constitutional right to privacy arising out of the 14th
Amendment right to liberty and struck down abortion laws in order
to protect a woman's interest in liberty from physical and
psychological harm.
4 3
37. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
38. Id., at 488.
39. Id., at 490-491.
40. Regulation 865, R.R.O. 1980, s.31(2).
41. See Quint, "The Right to Treatment in the Least Restrictive
Alternative: The Confusion Remains after Youngberg v.
Romeo" (1983), 19 New Eng. L. Rev. 175.
42. 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
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As a passing comment, I would note that U.S. cases have generally
upheld negative, rather than affirmative rights, i.e. granting free-
dom from government intervention rather than imposing a positive
duty upon the government. Thus, attempts to develop a constitu-
tional right to treatment or a right to a minimum level of welfare
assistance have met with little success.
4 4
The Charter's language is somewhat more affirmative but it is
quite likely to be interpreted on this point in the same way as the
U.S. Bill of Rights. 4 5 This problem can be side-stepped by phrasing
the issue in the negative sense, i.e. "freedom from transfer
trauma". To assert a positive right to a particular level of care
would be a much more difficult proposition.
Naturally, the above is only a sketchy outline of the arguments and
types of evidence which could be marshalled to assert a constitu-
tional interest in freedom from transfer trauma, but I think that it
is sufficient to show that such an interest could be established. By
drawing on such sources as tort law, the rules governing physicians,
the type of rights said to be due procedural fairness under the
natural justice doctrine, the concept that where a right is created
by statute the finding of the condition which triggers loss of the
right requires due process, the recognition in the "free and
democratic society" to our south of transfer trauma as a consti-
tutionally protected interest, the U.S. concepts of right to treat-
ment and the privacy doctrine, it can be demonstrated that in our
society the threat posed by the potential effects of transfer
trauma is indeed considered a threat to "life, liberty and security
of the person."
After establishing a constitutional interest, the next stage in the
analysis is to ask whether it has been infringed.
43. Ibid. See Hughes, §upra note 34. Some authors have also
tried to draw a constitutional right to dignity from the cases
establishing a right to privacy: see Poust, "Human Dignity as
a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudentially Based Enquiry
into Criteria and Content" (1984), 27 Howard L.J. 145.
44. Bender, op. cit. note 13, at 822; Pennhurst State School v.
Halderman 51 U.S. 1 (1980). -
45. Bender, op. cit. note 13, at 823. For a more affirmative view
of the "rights" guaranteed by the Charter (as opposed to the
"freedoms" for which only non-interference by the state is
guaranteed) see Allman et al. and Commmissioner of the
Northwest Territories (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 467,
(N.W.T.S.C.).
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Substantive Effect of Section 7
The scope of s. 7 is still unclear. One basic question is whether s. 7
has merely procedural effect or whether it also requires
substantive due process. That is, is s. 7 complied with if there is
proper notice and hearing etc. (as required under the "natural
justice" doctrine) or does s. 7 also permit review of the substance
of the legislation to determine whether it is reasonable or whether
it infringes any constitutionally guaranteed rights? Can a constitu-
tional right be infringed under s. 7 as long as the required amount
of procedural fairness is present?
One reading of s. 7 would be that the first clause establishes the
substantive effect of the section and the second clause provides for
procedural fairness. They are, after all, joined by the conjunctive
"and" and therefore must speak to different purposes.4 6 The two
clauses could also be read sequentially such that both requirements
must be met.
Cases on this point thus far differ. 4 7 The issue is merely touched
on here as it is not of crucial importance: procedural due process
is, in any event, lacking in the instant case.
Infringement Of The Constitutional Interest and Fundamental
Justice.
If a constitutional right to freedom from transfer trauma is
established, then clearly it is infringed by an unwilling and unpre-
pared transfer from a hospital to a nursing home (assuming that the
evidence on the potential effects of transfer trauma is accepted).
The next step is to consider whether that infringement has taken
place without due process.
This points out the difficulties of constitutional analysis: a step by
step analysis helps to ensure clear thinking and consistency, yet the
subject matter is by its very nature extremely fluid. To consider
46. See Bender, op. cit., note 13, at 824.
47. Cases favouring a substantive nterpretation of s. 7 include
R. v. Roblin (1982), 1 C.R.R. 1286, (Que. Ct. Sess.); R. L.
Crain Inc. v. Couture (1983), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 478, (Sask-. Q.
B.); and Reference Re s. 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act B.C.
(1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 243, (B.C.C.A.). Cases favouring only
procedural effect for s. 7 include Re Jameson and The Queen
(1982), 70 C.C.C. (2d) 430, (Que. S.C.); R. v. Hayden (1983), 3
D.L.R. (4th) 361, (Man. C.A.); and Latham v. Solicitor
General of Canada (1984), 12 C.C.C. (3d) 9, (F.C.T.D.).
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whether someone has been deprived of a constitutional interest
other than "in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice" it is necessary to consider what level of procedural
fairness fundamental justice requires here; the "fairness" provided
by fundamental justice is a sliding scale of procedural
requirements 4 8 which in turn depends upon a balancing of the
interests involved. This balancing of the interests involved is also
a function of s. 1 of the Charter, the next step in the analysis. In
effect, the discussion could take place at either level. For the
purposes of this paper, I will largely discuss the balancing of
interests in the context of s. 1.
Procedural fairness in the instant case is non-existent. Pursuant to
the legislation, the decision need merely be made by a physician at
the hospital. There is no requirement of consultation,
consideration of the patient's views, etc. As well, the decision
takes effect immediately with no opportunity for reconsideration.
The actual process (as opposed to the legislative requirements) will
vary from hospital to hospital.
This procedure is clearly inadequate. If prison inmates and
parolees retain the right to due process in restrictions on their
liberties, 4 9 as do involuntarily committed mental patients, 5 0 then
surely the ordinary citizen who is being treated in a hospital
deserves at least some minimum of due process before deprivation
of a constitutional right.
5 1
Administrative law cases also support this contention. The bare
minimum of "fairness" under the "natural justice" doctrine includes
48. See note 31.
49. Latham v. Solicitor General of Canada, supra note 48;
Cadieux v. the Director of Mountain Institution (1984), 12
W.C.B. 194, (F.C.T.D.); Wolff, Warden, et al. v. MacDonald
418 U.S. 539 (1974); Vitek, Correctional Director et al. v.
Jones 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
50. Mental Health Act R.S.O. 1980, chapter 262; Lake v.
Cameron 364 F. (2d) 657 (1966); Covington v. Harris 419 F.
(2d) 617 (1969); Youngberg v. Romeo 102 S.Ct. 2452 (1982);
O'Connor v. Donaldson 422 U. S. 563 (1975).
51. Note that the administrative concerns being balanced in the
cases of prisoners and mental patients are similar to those in
the instant case. It may be suggested that the cases are not
similar because in the instant case we are dealing with
voluntary patients, but surely the voluntariness is illusory:
where else are they to go?
(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.
a right to know the essence of the case against the individual and
an opportunity to reply5 2 (which doctrine has also been ack-
nowledged in the context of s. 7)53
In the American case of Brede v. Director For Department of
Health, 5 4 state law granted entitlement to treatment but also gave
unrestricted state authority to transfer (very similar to the instant
case). The court held that legislative entitlement to treatment at
a facility, even though not a particular facility, meant that a
certain amount of due process was required. Once entitlement to a
benefit is determined, it is necessary to decide what process is due:
"The cases have recognized that when the deprivation
of some government benefit would operate so as to
impose severe hardship upon individuals with an
entitlement to that benefit, due process protection in
the form of a pre-termination hearing may be
required."55
In Brede, the court held that such a hearing was required, (due to
the potential effects of transfer trauma), where the state was
going to transfer the residents of a leprosarium.
The above sources indicate that infringement of a right of this type
requires more due process than is currently provided for in the
legislation. At this point it is appropriate to consider the effect of
the medical nature of the issue on judicial thinking. Will the courts
hold that the process provided for by the legislation is appropriate
and sufficient as the matter is essentially a medical one?
The U. S. Supreme Court answered that question in the case of
Vitek v. Jones 5 6 (referred to above), as follows:
'The medical nature of the enquiry, however, does not
justify dispensing with due process requirements. It is
52. Webb, supra note 28; Knapman supra note 30; Lazaraov,
supra, note 32; Re Ruiperez and Board of Governors of
Lakehead University (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 552 (Ont. C.A.); Re
Giroux and The Queen In Right of Ontario (1984), 46 O.R.
(2d) 276
53. Re Mason and The Queen (1983), 43 O.R. (2d) 321, (H.C.J.).
54. 616 F. (2d) 407 (1980).
55. Id., at 412.
56. Supra note 37.
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precisely "the subtleties and nuances of psychiatric
diagnosis" that justifies the requirement of adversary
hearings."
5 7
Substituting "medical" for "psychiatric" one could make similar
answer in the instant case. Unfortunately, in the later case of
Youngberg 5 8  the U. S. Supreme Court was decidedly more
deferential to "experts", stating the courts should not "second-
guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are
better informed", 5 9 and further that:
"...the decision, if made by a professional, is
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when
the decision by the professional is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgement,
practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
person responsible actually did not base the decision on
such a judgement. '6 0
In short the U.S. Supreme Court opted for a malpractice
standard 6 l and basically washed its hands of the "medical" decision
of appropriate restraints. Courts in Canada are also traditionally
reluctant to interfere with the decisions of experts. 6 2 Will this
lead them to say that in the case of involuntary hospital transfers
the infringement of the constitutional right occurs with all the
"fundamental justice" that is required in that situation?
Three answers can be made to this challenge. First, counsel for
the patient would probably argue, along the lines of the quote from
Vitek v. Jones 63 (above) that it is precisely the nuances and
uncertainties of this "medical" issue which demand some sort of a
hearing.
57. Id., at 495.
58. Youngberg v. Romeo, supra note 50.
59. Id., at 2462.
60 Id., at 2463.
61. See, for example, Wright and Linden, Canadian Tort Law (6th
ed., Butterworths, 1975), at 187; and Landeros v. Flood 551 P.
2d 389 (1976), at 392.
62. Cowan, "Recent Developments in Judicial Review" in Charter
of Rights and Administrative Law, (Carswell, Bar Admission
Course Materials, 1983), at 39.
63. Supra note 57.
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Second, even if this is a medical question best decided by doctors,
the consequences of the decision are serious enough to at least
require an opportunity for the patient to make representations to
the decision-maker and an opportunity to appeal the decision (even
if to a panel of doctors).
Finally, even if one doctor's opinion is sufficient, as provided for in
the legislation, if the evidence on the effects of transfer trauma is
accepted then if a doctor transfers an "at risk" patient to a nursing
home without a relocation program, it can be argued that the
doctor is exceeding his or her jurisdiction (and therefore not
providing "fundamental justice") in making a decision other than on
the criteria of the legislation.
To elaborate briefly on the last point: the legislation, on the face
of it, vests great discretion in the doctor. 6 4 Discretion must be
exercised according to the statutory wording which grants it and in
accordance with the policy, scope and object of the Act as a
whole. 6 5 As well, it must be exercised on the basis of -objective
evidence: it is not sufficient to merely state a conclusion repeating
the words of the statute. 6 6  The wording in s. 31 of the
regulation6 7 is that "when a patient is no longer in need of
treatment in a hospital... " (emphasis-added) which is not the
same as "when a doctor deems that a patient is no longer in need of
treatment in a hospital... ". The decision to discharge can only
be made when a specific condition is met and that must be
64. Regulation 865 R.R.O. 1980, s.31, although the caselaw even
prior to Charter clearly indicates that our courts are able to
apply procedural fairness even where statutory wording
seems to grant unfettered discretion: Knapman, supra note
30; Lazarov, supra note 32; Pue, Natural Justice in Canada,
(Butterworths, 1980), at 87; Mullan, "Developments in
Administrative Law; the 1978-79 Term" (1980), 1 Sup. Ct. L.
Rev. I at 21; R. v. Workman's Compensation Board; ex-parte
Kuzyk (1968), 2 O.R. 337, (Ont. C.A.); C.U.P.E. Local 963 v.
New Brunswick Liquor Corp. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227.
65. Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (19681
A.C. 997; Multi-Malls Inc. v. Minister of Transportation and
Communications (1976), 14 O.R. (2d), 49 (Ont. C.A.); Re
Doctors Hospital and Minister of Health (1976), 12 O.R. (20
164.
66. Re Lord's Day Alliance of Canada and Regional Municipality
of Peel (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 657.
67. Regulation 865, R.R.O 1980, s.31
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determined by objective evidence.
6 8
This theory is further supported by the wording of s. 31(1) of
regulation 865,69 dealing with admission, which states that a
person shall be admitted "when the medical practitioner is of the
opinion that it is medically necessary for the person to be admitted
to hospital ..." (emphasis added). Section 31(2), dealing with
discharge, states that "when a patient is no longer in need of
treatment in a hospital ..." (emphasis added) the patient shall be
discharged. The statutory wording thus provides an objective
standard for discharge as opposed to the more subjective and
discretionary one for admission. 7 0  Thus a doctor transferring
without applying the standard would not be providing the ro-
cedural fairness due when a constitutional right is threatened.
7 f
This argument, that the individual involved is exceeding his/her
jurisdiction, used so often in administrative law cases to avoid
exclusionary clauses, could be used in this context to evade
attempts to limit the procedural fairness due on infringement of a
constitutional right, particularly if Canadian courts adopt the U.S.
practice of applying the Constitution not only to the wording of
legislation but also to the acts of officials (who are perhaps not
68. As in Knapman, supra note 30.
69. Regulation 865, R.R.O. 1980, s.31(l).
70. Id., s. 31(2). This is in line with the cases stating that taking
away of privilege requires due process even if granting the
privilege initially does not: Webb, supra note 28; Goldberg,
supra note 35.
71. Consider also that it is fairly certain that a doctor who
discharged a patient in need of continued care (although not
at the hospital level), when there was no nursing home bed
available would be exceeding his or her jurisdiction, as the
patient would, in those circumstances, continue to be in need
of treatment at a hospital. The condition precedent to
discharge would not have been met. Likewise it can be
argured that a doctor who discharges an at-risk patient
without a relocation preparation program has exceeded his or
her jurisdiction. The person continues to be in need of
treatment in the hospital because the alternative is a high
likelihood of death, just as in the case of someone discharged
and turned out onto the street when no bed is available.
While as a matter of degree the cases are different (and thus
the former is more difficult to argue than the latter) the
principle remains the same.
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correctly following constitutionally adequate legislation). 7 2
Thus, having established a constitutional right to freedom from
transfer trauma, it is obvious on the face of it that an unwilling
and unprepared transfer infringes this constitutional right. Moving
on to the next stage in the analysis, by examining the level of
procedural fairness due in analogous situations, it can be seen that
under current legislation this infringement is made without pro-
cedural fairness (the "fundamental justice" part of s. 7). The
challenge that the medical nature of the issue limits the procedural
fairness due can be dealt with. It is not necessary to identify the
precise procedural requirements needed here to satisfy
"fundamental justice"; it is enough to establish that the current
procedural provisions are insufficient.
At this stage of the analysis, the existence of a constitutional
right, and the infringement of that right without due process, have
been shown. The next step (perhaps the most difficult) is to decide
whether the unconstitutional legislation is saved by s. I of the
Charter.
'The Effect of Section 1
At this point, it is useful to look briefly at the American approach
to constitutional analysis. The American and Canadian approaches
would diverge earlier, at the point at which a constitutional
interest has been identified. The U.S. courts would at that point
begin to balance the interests of the individual against those of the
government or institution. Under the Charter it would appear that
s. 7 rights should be taken as absolute at the initial stage and any
balancing of interests should only occur after that, when s. 1 is
brought into play. 7 3 Section 1 of the Charter reads as follows:
1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."7 4
U.S. Courts have applied a variety of standards in testing the
72. Bender, op. cit. note 13, at 827.
73. Re Soenen and Thomas et al. (1983), 8 C.C.C. (3d) 224, (Alta.
Q.B.); R. v. Videoflicks Ltd. (1985), 48 O.R. (2d) 395, (Ont.
C.A.).
74. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1
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constitutionality of state statutes, but they can be roughly divided
into two categories.
7 5
The easiest is the "minimum scrutiny" test. To satisfy this test the
government need only show a conceivable rational basis for the
statutory provision that will further a legitimate state goal, A
statute is only constitutional if it is wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the state's objective.
The other test is the "compelling interest" or strict scrutiny" test
and it is used when a government classification is based upon a
"suspect classification" such as race (this would relate to s. 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) or a "fundamental
right" is adversely affected. The latter test has been extended into
the area of mental health law.7 6 It requires that there be a clear
and present danger and that the government action is a strict
necessity to serve a compelling governmental objective.
7 7
Going back to the analysis followed in Canadian courts, it is not
yet clear what the test is, althought a test similar to the
"compelling interest" test has been propounded in some cases.
7 8
Given the difficulties which the American approach has led to
(including the development of an intermediate level of scutiny in
some cases), it is unlikely that Canadian courts will follow that
example. This view is reinforced by the fact that we have a single
test spelled out in s. I (unlike the U.S., where it was developed by
75. Bender, "Justifications for Limiting Constitutionally
Guaranteed Rights and Freedoms: Some Remarks About the
Proper Role of Section One of the Canadian Charter" (1984),
13 Man. L. J. 669, at 671.
76. Quint, 'The Right to Treatment in the Least Restrictive
Alternative: The Confusion Remains after Youngberg v.
Romeo", (1983), 19 New Eng. L. R. 175, at 180.
77. Bender, op. cit. note 75 at 671.
78. Re Reich and College of Physicians and Surgeons, (April 6,
1984, Alta Q. B., McDonald J.,), in Laskin et al., The
Canadian Charter of Rights Annotdted, (Canada Law Book
Ltd.), p. 8-5; Crain v. Couture (1984), 6 D.L.R. (4th) 478,
(Sask. Q.B.). For an opposite view see Re Federal Republic
of Germany and Rauca, (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 225, (Ont. C.A.).
(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.
the courts) and it is a flexible one.
7 9
A three step procedure for the application of s. 1 is set out in the
Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board
of CensorstU. It proceeds as follows:
1. Is the limitation "demonstrably justifiable"?
2. Is it "reasonable"?
3. Is it "prescribed by law"?
Demonstrably Justifiable
There is no presumption of legislative validity in applying the
Charter 8l and there have been suggestions of a leaning in favour of
the rights of the individual. 8 2 The onus is on the government or
institution to demonstrate justification for infringement once a
limitation on a fundamental right or freedom has been shown.83
It seems likely that our courts will hold that the legislative end
involved must be more or less "compelling" (i.e. justifiable) depend-
ing upon the relative importance of the right being infringed versus
that of the governmental interest. Working from a standard of
reasonableness, as envisaged by s. 1, it seems clear that the two
79. It is also reinforced by the fact that U.S. levels of scrutiny
arose largely in the context of equal protection, rather than
due process; also both are contained in the same section of
the 14th Amendment and thus a similar analysis is applied to
each. In the Charter equal protection and due process are
separated into different sections, and they do not arise out of
the same historical context.
80. (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 583, (Div. Ct.)
81. Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario
Board of Censors, supra note 80; Law Society of Upper
Canada v. Skapinker, supra note 17.
82. Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca, sup note 78;
Crain v. Couture, supra note 78.
83 Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society, supra note
80; Public Service Alliance of Canada v. The Queen in Right
of Canada (March 21, 1984, F.C.T.C., Reed J.), in Canadian
Charter of Rights Annotated; Re Cadeddu and the Queen
(1982), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 97, (Ont. H.C.J); Re Southam Inc. and
the Queen (No. 1) (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 113, (Ont. C.A.); Re
Jamieson and The Queen (1982), 70 C.C.C. (2d) 430, (Que.
S.C.).
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polarized extremes of the U.S. levels of scrutiny are inappropriate;
what is required is a balancing of the interests involved in each
case. Thus, in beginning a s. 1 analysis it is necessary to consider:
a) is there a legitimate governmental interest to be served here;
and b) is that interest still justifiable when one considers the
importance of the right being infringed? After deciding those
questions, one can move on to the next step of considering the
reasonableness of the particular limitation.
An American case, where application was made for an injunction to
remove a patient who had refused to be transferred from a hospital
to a nursing home, provides an example of a hospital's interests.
The court said of the hospital:
"It has a moral duty to reserve its accommodation for
persons who actually need medical and hospital care
and it would be a deviation from its purposes to act as a
nursing home for aged persons who do not need constant
medical care but who need nursing care. There are
homes for the aged, there are nursing homes and similar
institutions. Hospitals have a duty not to permit their
facilities to be diverted to the uses for which hospitals
are not intended."8 4
The governmental interest here seems to be a concern over the
allocation of scarce resources. On the face of it, this will probably
be accepted as a legitimate concern by our courts. But is it still
legitimate when compared to the importance of the right being
limited? Some infringement on the right to freedom from transfer
trauma is justifiable, in the sense that it would not be reasonable
to prohibit any and all transfers of elderly patients because of the
potential effects of transfer trauma; in that sense, the
constitutional right involved is not an absolute one. If, on the
other hand, the right to freedom from transfer trauma was seen to
simply prohibit transfers without a relocation preparation program,
perhaps the right could be seen as absolute.
It is unclear whether the limitation would fail at this stage (all
three requirements of s. 1 must be met) or not.
Reasonable Limitation
Is the limitation reasonable? It seems likely that Canadian courts
will take the approaco that a limitation is reasonable when it is a
84. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School v. Geoghegan 281
F. Supp. 116 (Dist. Ct. 1967).
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means proportionate to the end at which the law is directed. 8 5 In
U.S. cases using the "strict scrutiny" test, the "least restrictive
alternative" test has been employed to ensure that where a
legitimate state goal exists, the least restrictive alternative is
used to achieve that goal.8 6 This test has been applied to mental
health cases. 8 7 There is some suggestion that this test will be used
by Canadian courts,8 8 but it is not yet clear that it will. Again, it
is likely that Canadian courts will eventually agree on a more
flexible test, i.e. the more important the right infringed, and the
greater the infringement, the more closely tailored to the intended
end the state's infringement must be.
In determining the reasonableness of the limitation, how do the
interests balance in the instant case? In the very similar U.S. case
of Brede 8 9 (above) the interests of the state in transferring the
residents of a leprosarium were outweighed by the potential harm
to the patients. Likewise, in the cases of Yaretsky v. Blum, Bracco
v. Lackner, Rockhill Care Centre v. Harris, and Klein v. Mathews,
it was held that the state's interest in transferring medicaid
recipients to a different nursing home would not be substantially
hurt by the provision of some procedural fairness. 9 0
85. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards v. Attorney
General of Quebec (No.2) (1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 33, (Que.
S.C); Hawkins, "Making Section One Work" in Charter of
Rights and Administrative Law, (Carswell, Bar Admission
Course Materials, 1983) at 130; Southam, supra note 83;
Public Service Alliance, supra note 83.
86. Legal Rights of the Mentally Handicapped (vol. 2, Practicing
Law Institute); Cort, Rebecca "Judicial Schizophrenia: An
Involuntarily Confined Mental Patient's Right to Refuse Anti-
Psychotic Drugs" (1982), 51 U.M.K.C.L. Rev. 74, at 91; Lake
v. Cameron, supra note 50; Covington v. Harris, supra note
50; Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (1971); Rogers v.
Okin, 634 F (2d) 650 (1980).
87. Lake v. Cameron, Covington v. Harris, Wyatt v. Stickney,
supra note 86; Youngberg v. Romeo, supra note 50.
88. Hawkins, supra note 85, at 131.
89. 616 F (2d) 407 (1980).
90. Yaretsky v. Blum 629 F (2d) 817 (U.S.C.A 1980), although at
the U.S. Supreme Court level it was decided that the actions
of the nursing home did not constitute "government action",
102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982); Bracco v. Lackner 462 F. Supp. 436
(Calif. 1978); Rockhill Care Centre v. Harris 502 F. Supp.
1005 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1977). These cases each dealt with 1227
(Miss. Dist. Ct. 1980); Klein v. Mathews 430 F. Supp.
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The interests of the individual have not always fared so well in U.S.
cases. In the Youngberg9l case, quoted above regarding the
presumptive validity of the opinions of expert administrators, the
court's comments were made with the full realization that such
institutions often offer less than adequate surroundings:
"Such a presumption [of the validity of professional
opinions] is necessary to enable institutions of this type
- often, unfortunately, overcrowded and under staffed -
to continue to function."
9 2
Financial considerations and administrative difficulties have been
held to be legitimate considerations in balancing the interests of
the state and the individual, 9 3 and the practical realities of the
institutional setting must be considered. 9 4 However, these admin-
istrative concerns have received a set-back recently in the
Supreme Court of Canada, and may not be given as much weight as
previously expected. 9 5
90. decertification of an entire nursing home and the issue was
the residents' desire to have standing at the decertification
hearing, which is a different issue than the requirement of a
hearing for each resident at the individual time of discharge
from an institution. In Rockhill the court held that the
situation was closer to the Goldberg v. Kelly (see note 35)
situation than that in Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319
(1976); where right to a hearing was denied in terminating
disability benefit payments) as the "clogging of the
administrative process" was not present. It could be claimed
that such "clogging" is potentially present in the situation of
individual transfers.
91. Youngberg v. Romeo, supra note 50.
92. Id., at 2463.
93. Quint, op. cit., note 41, at 184; Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1976); Youngberg v. Romeo, supra note 50, at 2461;
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1
(1981). In Wyatt v. Stickney, supra note 87, the Court upheld
the right of mental health patients to adequate care despite
the cost issue: the individual rights of-the patients were held
to outweigh the cost considerations of the state in a case of
severe cutbacks.
94. Ingraham v. Wright, supra note 93; Wolff v. McDonald, supra
note 49.
95. Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, quotes
from Madam Justice Wilson as reported in Ontario Lawyer's
Weekly, Aug. 26, 1985.
(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.
In balancing the "liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society"9 6 in the instant case, one must balance the
-potential harm (including possibly death) to the patient and the
personnel and financial limitations and overcrowding problems of
the hospitals. The interests on both sides are strong. However, I
think it likely that a court would be convinced that a hospital
which transfers a patient without taking into account at all the
potential effects of transfer trauma is going beyond what is
necessary to achieve its ends.
The right being infringed is important and the infringement severe;
therefore the means must be closely tailored to the intended end,
which they are not. Hospitals could provide relocation preparation
programs prior to transfer, and some sort of opportunity to have
input into the transfer decision, together with a right of appeal,
without severely impairing their own interests. Transfers do not
usually take place very quickly anyway, due to the scarcity of
nursing home beds, so the process would probably not be slowed
down very much. There would be some additional cost in implemen-
ting a relocation preparation program, but that seems a minor
consideration in this context.
The greatest impact could be on nursing homes. It is the scaricty
of nursing home beds which is the major factor in peremptory
moves and which presents a major difficulty in preparing for
relocation (i.e., it is difficult to prepare for a move to a particular
home when it could be a long time before that particular home has
a bed free). If a case such as proposed here were successful, no
doubt the next step would be to litigate to try to force the
government to provide more nursing home beds (a more difficult
proposition).
It would seem that the current limitation on the right to freedom
from transfer trauma is not reasonable. An intermediate course
could be taken which would not infringe too greatly on the rights of
the patients or on the concerns of the hospital.
Prescribed By Law
While the current procedure is authorized by the legislation, that
may not be sufficient for it to be considered to be "prescribed by
law.",9 7 The procedure for discharges could be held to be void for
vagueness as it gives absolutely no indication of the basis on which
a doctor is to exercise his or her discretion. On that basis, the
96. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 1.
97. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1.
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procedure may not be properly prescribed by law.
9 8
Thus, to conclude the s. 1 analysis, some limitation on the rights of
the transferees may be justifiable, but the current limitation is
certainly not reasonable and may not be properly prescribed by
law. Therefore s.l will not save the constitutionally invalid
legistation.
Judicial Remedies
Section 24 of the Charter gives the court wide powers regarding
remedies:
"24.(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed
by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may
apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just
in the circumstances."
9 9
American courts have been quite activist in fashioning appropriate
remedies, 10 0 expressing a judicial activism foreign to the Canadian
judiciary. 1 0 1 It is not necessary that the courts spell out what
would be acceptable procedure. In most cases of unconstitutional
infringement of rights and freedoms, the courts will no doubt
content themselves with declaring legislative enactments invalid,
leaving it to the government to draw up new provisions.
However, they may in some cases provide some guidelines to
indicate what would satisfy them. In the instant case, it would
seem that an appropriate remedy, and one that our courts could be
comfortable with, would be to basically leave the decision making
structure intact, but to provide for an opportunity to discuss the
matter with the decision-making physician, and a right of appeal;
and also to require hospitals to consider the potential effects of
98. Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society, supra, note
80; Reference Re Education Act and Minority Language
Educational Rights, (June 26, 1984) 26 A.C.W.S. (2d) 146,
(Ont. G.A.), referred to in Canadian Charter of Rights
Annotated, p. 8-6.
99. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s. 24.
100. Richards and Smith, "Applying the Charter" Charter of
Rights and Administrative Law (Carswell, Bar Admission
Course Materials, 1983), at 149; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1972).
101. Richards and Smith, ibid., note 100.
(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.
transfer trauma and to provide a relocation preparation program
where there is danger of transfer trauma. In this way the needs of
both parties could be adequately balanced and the court would
avoid tampering too much with legislative intent and with decision
making by "experts".
Conclusion
This paper suggests the liklihood of success in a case based on
transfer trauma. It would appear that a constitutionally protected
interest is present, pursuant to s. 7 of the Charter, it has been
infringed without any of the procedural fairness due under the
concept of "fundamental justice," and the infringement is not saved
by s. 1 of the Charter.
The thus far unlitigated situation of unwilling transfers from
hospitals to nursing homes, apart from being an interesting and
challenging issue in itself, provides an example of the wide variety
of problems with potential remedies now available through the
Charter. A case such as this one could perhaps have been argued*
on natural justice grounds, but it is certainly a stronger case
argued as a constitutionally protected right.
It can be seen that the success of cases such as this one can depend
on the methods of Charter analysis developed by our courts. It is
essential that a logical framework of analysis be developed around
the Charter if there is to be any predictability and consistency in
its application. However, as can be seen from the tentative steps
to distill a process for Charter analysis in this paper, it is a very
slippery topic.
Although it was only briefly touched on in this paper, it is'also
clear that evidence of a wide-ranging and detailed nature can be
crucial to the success of a Charter case.
It will be fascinating to see the issues which are raised, and t~e
methods of analysis which are developed, over the coming years.
